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iN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
i ) L I~\\ T E t ~ 0 ~ s T R l T (_ 1 T I 0:\ ( 1 ( ) j I p .. -\X \ T 1 
a corporation, 
-V8.-
1~,1{..:-\XJ(LlX NA 1_,l()XAL I~\}·;t Tl1~.\XCJ1~ 
< ~o.JI P ANY, 
a corporation, 
DefendaJll and 11e:.,·pondeJlt. 
-'":\PPELL.A_XT'~ BRIEF 
(_ \l:--;e N" o. 
9315 
SineP thi~ appeal relates ahno:--;t entirely to the plead-
ings in the subject case and the pleadings in Civil No. 
11G.:22:2, filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
a developn1ent of thP factual background of both cases 
Is necessary. 
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On February 28, 1955, appellant, Ple,ve C1onstrue-
tion Con1pany, entered into a contract ,,~ith Cudahy 
Packing Company for the construction of an addition 
to the Cudahy Plant at North Salt Lake City, l~tah. 
During the construction, a fire occurred in the beef cooler 
roo1n January 27, 1956. ( R. 2, 8) 
Fiberglas Engineering & Supply Division of Q,yens-
Corning Fiberglas Corporation 'vas a subcontractor for 
Ple·w·e and was engaged in the installation of fiberglass 
insulation in the beef cooler room, at the time of the fire. 
The fire ocurred, causing damage to equip1nent and 
to a portion of Cudahy's plant, and Cudahy sued Plewe 
to recover the damages suffered in the fire. (Ex.-File 
No. 116,222) The Complaint stated causes of action in 
contract in Count I and in negligence in Count II. In 
the Answer filed by Plewe, he denied liability and spe-
cifically denied the allegations relating to exclu8ive C'On-
trol of the premises and of the 'vork on the addition, and 
alleged that the premises 'Yere in possession of the plain-
tiff and of other contractors, and he further alleged con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
Thereafter, Ple"~e joined Fiberglas as a third party 
defendant, alleging that if there "~as any liability of 
Ple"'"e to Cudahy, Fiberglas, because of its subcontract 
work in the area, was liable to Ple"-e. Fiberglas denied 
liability and included by 'Yay of defense an allegation 
that Fiberglas had paid Cudahy for a covenant not to sue 
and that Ple,Ye "-as thereby barred in its third party 
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<·o1nplaint. :F,ibergla~ ah~o filed a l1 ros~ Co1nplaint 
ag·ainst C~udahy, alleging that it had paid $59,5:23.07 
to Cudahy for the dan1age and for a covenant not to sue. 
In Ans\vers to IntPrrogatories filed Octobt>r :21, 1959, 
Cudahy stated that the da1nage it suffered included the 
ro~t of reconditioning and repairing its o'Yn equip1nent 
da1uaged by the fire, the cost of repairing it~ plant danl-
ag(·d by the fire, and also, the loss of business and inci-
dPntal expenses resulting fro1n a plant shut-do,vn caused 
by the fir(:l. ( I~x. File No. 11(),~~:2) 
Thereafter, F,iberglas' ·Cross Co1nplaint "~as dis-
llliHsed and after considerable Pre-Trial investigation, 
the case came on for a jury trial. At the trial, the jury· 
"·a:-: selected and then just prior to connnence1uent of 
the proof, the case 'vas settled and co1npron1ised by the 
payn1ent to the plaintiff of $12,500.00. The settlement 
'\'a~ n1ade by 1neans of a Judg1nent confessed to by ap-
pellant, Plewe. The Inethod of settle1nent is the n1ain 
prohle1n before us on the appeal. The present action ":-as 
filed by appellant, Ple,ve, against respondent, seeking re-
rovery of the amount paid pursuant to said settlement, 
attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of the prior action, 
and attorneys' fees and costs incurred in pursuing the 
present action, all based on the insurance policy issued 
hy respondent to appellant. 
The Co1nplaint (R. 4), the Ans,ver (R. 8), the 
Arnendment to the Complaint (R. 14), and the Ans,ver 
to Amendment to Complaint (R. 20), established the 
follo,ving material undisputed facts: 
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1. That Cudahy and Ple\\·e had a construction con-
tract under \vhich Ple"·e had performed \vork up to the 
tirne of the fire; that the fire occurred January 27, 1956 
in the beef cooler roon1, resulting in damages to Cudahy; 
and that Cudahy asserted a claiin against I)le\Ye by filing 
civil action X o. 11(),:2:2:2, to reeover damages jn the an1ount 
of $119,0-1-7.:35, based upon the contractual relation:ship 
bet\\·een CridaLay and l)le~,ye, a:ad also upon the 
negligence of Ple,ve. (R. 2, I)ara. 3 and -!; R. 8, Para. 1) 
2. That respondent \vas given a copy of the ·Coin-
plaint and thereafter repeatedly \vas informed of the 
defense of the law suit, and \vas requested to participate 
therein; that respondent refused to do so up to and 
through the final negotiation and settlt~lnent of the la-'v 
suit. 
3. That the negligence insurance policy (Ex. 1) \Yas 
in full force and effect at the tin1e of the fire. 
The sante pleadings formulated the follo"ring dis-
puted iss uP~ of fact n1aterial to the points on appeal: 
1. To \vhat extent, if any, "·as the property dam-
aged by the fire "·ithin the rare, custody or control of 
appellant? 
2. What notice, if any, of the fire 'vas given re-
spondent·? 
3. If inadequate notice \vas given, 'vhether or not 
the notice \vas \vaived by respondent. 
On April 26, 1960, a Pre Trial 'vas held before 
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Honorable StP\YHl't .Jl. 1-lan~on, and a J>re rr,rial ()nlPr 
'ra~ i~~uPd. (it 1 G-:20) .... \t thi~ tinlP a further I're Trial 
"·a~ ~et for .Jl a~· 20, 19GO and thP ultin1atP trial for June 
1 ;>, 1960. ~\~ a result of the .April :2() PrP-1~ rial, an 
1\111enchnent to the ·Con1plaint and an ..c\n~nver to said 
1\ 111Pnd1nent "·ere filed by the re~pe('tive parties. (R .. 
1-l-, :20) .. At the next J>re-Trial hearing on ~I a~· :20, 19GO, 
of "·hich no record 'vas rnade, respondent introdurPd in 
~lllJllort of its .Jlotion for Sunnnary Judg1nent, the ~nb­
jP<'t insurance pol iey ( R. :2-l-) (Ex. 1), and although the 
1~re-Trial Order does not so indicate and although thPre 
"·a~ no record rnade of the hearing, respondent argued 
that the judgrnent in the prior case, _No. 116,222, \vas 
conclusive evidence of the fact of Ple,y·e's control of the 
propert~· damaged by the fire. Appellant, at ~aid hear-
ing, argued that not only the J udg1nent, but the entire 
file in said exhibit should be considered by· the Court, 
and further, that at the forthco1ning trial, evidence \vould 
~ho'v that the property damaged \vas not under the care, 
cu~tody or control of Ple,ve . 
. A..t this point, Judge Hanson entered a Summar)· 
J udgrnent (R. 31) indicating there "·as no rnaterial issue 
of fact, but at the same time, giving no reason for his 
decision and making no Findings or Conclusions from 
\vhich an appeal could be taken. Thereafter, upon 1\fo-
tion of appellant, the Court, although not delineating 
the Decision as a Findings, entered a l\Iemorandum De-
ci~ion, setting forth "·hat it considered to be the facts 
upon "·hich there was no issue and thus upon "·hich he 
could grant a Summary Judgment. (R. 39-41) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
At Pages 52-62 of the record, in order to make a 
· proper transcript of the proposed evidence to be offered 
relating to the lack of control of the property damaged, 
appellant made a proffer of proof at the hearing on the 
~lotion for X e\Y Trial. The ~I o6on :F'or X P\\T Trial "Tas 
denied and this Appeal \Yas taken. 
STATE~IENT OF POIX·TS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDG-
MENT IN CIVIL NO. 116,222 CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED 
THAT 'THE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS IN THE CARE, 
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF APPELLANT. 
A. RESPONDENT HAS NO STANDING TO RELY 
UPON SAID JUDGMENT. 
B. THE JUDGMEN'T IS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE 
AND NOT UPON CONTROL OF THE PREl\IISES OR CON-
TROL OF THE DAMAGED PROPERTY. 
C. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE 
POLICY EXCLUSION. 
D. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVELY BIND-
ING UPON APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
E. THE JUDGMENT HAS NO REFERENCE TO 'THE 
DAMAGED PROP-ERTY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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ARGU~1ENT 
~Phere are t\vo ntain intPrrelated errors counnitted by 
the lo,ver court 'vhiC'h have prevented appellant fro1n 
having an adequate consideration of its case at the trial 
level. ~rhese error8 are djseussed nuder Point~ I and II 
hPlow: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDG-
lVIENT IN CIVIL NO. 116,222 CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED 
THAT 'THE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS IN THE CARE, 
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF APPELLANT. 
A. RESPONDENT HAS NO STANDING TO RELY 
UPON SAID JUDGMENT. 
Inasn1uch as appellant has not had the opportunity 
of presenting evidence on the adequacy of notice to the 
insurance company, \Ye 1nust assu1ne in this Su1n1nary 
J udg1nent proceeding, that the Inatter is considered in a 
light most favorable to appellant. Therefore, as alleged 
in the Co1nplaint, the respondent had received adequate 
notice of the fire and of the proceedings undertaken by 
C\1dahy. N ot,Yithstanding this notice and infor1nation, 
rt}spondent refused to defend the rase or to take any 
part in the preparation of the defense or in the negotia-
tion of the ultimate settlement. Therefore, respondent, 
in attempting to invoke the protection of the exclusion 
clause, is in effect relying on a provision in the policy, 
\\~hen it has repudiated the policy and has denied lia-
bility thereunder. This is an inconsistent position and 
as indicated in Kershaw v. J.li aryland Casu.alty Co1npany, 
34~ P. 2d -!2 (·Cal., 1959), untenable. The ·Court held 
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that an insurance company could not deny liability under 
a policy and in a situation, such as \Ve have here, then 
invoke the protection of a clause put in the policy for its 
O\Vn benefit. See also Grant v. Sun Indemnity, 80 P2nd 
99G, 99·7 and Geddin and Sntilh 1:. St. Paul J! ercury 
Indemnity Contpany, 334 P.2nd 881. 
B. THE JUDGMEN'T IS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE 
AND NOT UPON CONTROL OF THE PREMISES OR CON-
TROL OF THE DAMAGED PROPERTY. 
In co1npro1nising and settling the Cudahy la-\Ysuit 
it is clear that the parties \Yere intending to and did 
dis1niss the contractual cause of action, Count I, and 
placed liability squarely upon the negligence cause of 
action, Count II. The settlement and liability \Yas fur-
ther narro,ved to a cause based ~'solely on the basis of 
negligence .. " and the general reference to ·Count II \Yas 
qualified by the specific reference to negligence liability. 
Therefore only that part of Count II relating to negli-
gence is even material here. The confession of judgment 
reads in part, (Ex., File 116,222.) : 
H ••• and a jur~~ haYing been en1paneled and 
the plaintiff thereupon having moved to re-
duce the prayer of its con1plaint and to disn1iss 
the first count of its co1nplaint, and to seek re-
covery against the defendant Plewe Construction 
Compan~r on the second count of its complaint, 
and solely· on the basis of the negligence of Ple\Ye 
Construction Co1npany ... " 
The ele1nents of negligence to \Vhich reference is 
above n1ade are found in Paragraph 7 of the first count 
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and an' incorporated in the ~eeond count h~· rPference. 
Paragraph 7 lists 7 individual negligent acts, any one 
or rnore of "·hich allPgPdly eansed the fire. X one of thP~P 
negligent aC'ts depended for its validity upon the care, 
eu~~tody or control of an~· property, nor even upon the 
allPgations of paragraph~ of Count II. 
Paragraph~' Count II reads as follo\\·s: 
~' _1-\ t the aforesaid tirne and prior thereto, the 
\\Tork on said addition and thP prernises therP-
about \\·ere under the exelusive control of the 
defPndant; the said fire ?rould not hare occurrerl 
in the a bse nee of n e.rJl igc uce as a fore said." (Italics 
added) 
This paragraph is the onl~T basis upon "·hich Respondent 
can rel~T as a cause of action corning \Yithin the exclusion-
ary language of the policy, yet the paragraph has nothing 
to do \\·ith negligence. Actuall~T the part not italicized 
also appears in the contractual cause of action, Para-
graph 9, Count I, \Yhich Count \Yas dismissed, further 
indicating lack of rnateriality to this negligence cause in 
Count II. The italicized portion clearly places added 
ernphasis upon the foregoing allegations of specific negli-
gence, and negatives an~T effect the first part of the para-
graph rnight concPivably have had in connection \\·ith 
negligence. Unless this is an attempt to allege the doc-
trine of Res Ipsa Loquiter, \Yhich only has presumptive 
Yalue, as a matter of evidencf', it is difficult to see \Yhat 
the purpose of this paragraph is at all. In any event, 
there are seven different negligence situations each of 
"Thich gave rise to possible liability of Plewe, and each of 
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\vhich \vere independent fro1n and not affected by para-
graph 2. 
Appellant, however, cannot be charged in this case 
\vith having control or having agreed to such a state1nent 
concerning control merely because he confessed judg-
Inent on the basis of negligence and upon the basis of 
Count II. Appellant certainly did not agree to all the 
facts alleged in the 10 paragraphs of Count I nor in 
the 3 paragraphs in Count II, since some of the allega-
tions relate to contractual liability and some have no 
particular relationship to either contractual or tort lia-
bility. Certainly it is not reasonable to hold that this 
Judgment based upon negligence is a binding stipulation 
as to all matters alleged in the Complaint. This Para-
graph 2 of Count II has no place in the negligence allega-
tions, and, therefore, cannot be held to have been ad-
Initted b~T appellant. 
The background of Civil X o. 116,~:22 is i1nportant in 
considering this n1atter for the reason that the legal 
theorie~ in thl~ First ·Count haYe 1nateriality to the lia-
bility of :B--,iberglas as a third party defendant. The dis-
tinction bet\Yeen a rau~P of action on eontraet in the 
First Count and a cause of aetion in tort on the Second 
(~ount \\Tas i1nportant in thr 1nanner of final settle1nent 
of the liabilities of all concerned. \Y. e cannot, therefore, 
jgnor<' thP 1neaning and the reasons for the dis1nissal of 
thP First Count and the responsibility of the negli-
gence allegations in the Second Count by considering 
the \vhole J udg1nent in a general n1anner \\Tithout giving 
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particular consideration to the individual parts thereof 
and to the particular elements of the ·Complaint referred 
to therein. Therefore, the general allegation in Para-
graph :2 certainly cannot be considered an adtnission con-
elusively binding upon appellant merely because he con-
fessed judgnH-_•nt solely upon negligence. 
C. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT FALL WI'THIN THE 
POLICY EXCLUSION. 
\V. e 1nust compare the \vording of the exelusion para-
graph in the policy \vith the wording of I_)aragraph 2 of 
the Second ·Count. 
The policy provides as follows : 
~·This policy does not apply: 
(f) Under coverage C to InJury to or 
destruction of ... property in the care, custody 
or control of the insured." 
Paragraph 2 of Count I provides: 
"'At the aforesaid time, and prior therPto, 
the \vork on said addition and the premises there-
abouts were under the exclusive control of the dP-
fendant; the said fire would not have occurred 
in the absence of negligencP as aforesaid.'' 
It is clear that Paragraph 2 is not couched in the 
sa1ne ter1ns as is the policy provision. Paragraph ~ 
says that work on the addition is in the control of appel-
lant. Work, of course, as it is here used, means the 
actual manual effort of construction. Paragraph 2 fur-
ther says that \vork on the premises or the premises 
thereabout are under the control of the contractor. Can 
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we infer reasonably that such a phrase conclusively 
includes the plant of Cudahy, the equipn1ent of Cudahy 
which was being stored by ·Cudahy in the area of the 
fire, or the loss of business because of the plant being 
shut do,,·n. ·Certainly such a general tern1 'vould need 
an1plification in order to bring 'vithin its meaning the 
property 'vhich 'vas actually damaged by the fire in this 
case. The damage is not alleged in Paragraph 2 to have 
resulted to property under the control of the contractor. 
It is clear that the intent of Paragraph ~ is not nearly 
so restricted as is the provision in the policy exclusion 
clause. X evertheless~ the lo,ver court has held that such 
a general statement has the san1e 1neaning as the very 
narrow provision in the policy. The court holds appel-
lant to a ver)~ strict adherence to the 'vords "~hen such 
'vords do not substantiate the court\~ position. The 
lo,ver court has refused to allo"'" additional evidence on 
the problem of control even though the proposed evi-
dence "~ould certainly explain the factual situation 'Yith 
'" hich "·e are concerned. 
The Complaint itself, therefor, does not bring the 
subject matter '"ithin the restricted 1neaning of the 
polic~r exclusion clause. Furthern1ore, the Interrogatories 
and Ans,vers thereto in the file of Civil X o. 11G.2:22, 
indicate ~lear}~~ that the da1nage to the building and to 
cPrtain of thP equip1nent could not be considered as 
'vithin the exclusive control of the contractor under the 
1neaning of the insurance polic)~ clause. The evidence 
proferred h~~ Appellant \\'"Ould also have sho,vn a com-
pJPte lack of such control of the property. 
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D. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVELY BIND-
ING UPON APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
In ordPr that a prior judg1nent against the insured 
hP conelu~ively binding upon him in a subsequent aetion 
again~t the insurer, thP issues in each action 1nust he 
identical and the issue involved in the t\\·o suits rnust 
have been 1naterial and necessary for recover~,. in the 
prior suit. ~:\s is stated in 12:3 A.L.R. 71-l-: 
''In a nu1nber of instances the vie\\' has l)een 
taken that, since the issue in question involved 
in the suit b)'" the injured party against the in-
sured \Yas not 1naterial to the dPeision of that 
case or 'vas not identical \\·ith the issnP in the 
instant case alleged to have been detPrmined hy 
the judg1nent in the prior action, the insurer could 
not rel~,. upon such judgmPnt as deter1nining sueh 
issue in its favor." 
In the case of Braley Jfotor Co. rs. North1rest Cas-
ualty, 49 P. 2nd 911 (\Vash. 1935) the case \vent to the 
jur~,. on three different conditions, only one of vvhich 
involved facts placing it under the policy exclusionar~,. 
clause. The Court there held that a judgment based 
thereon \\·as not conclusive because recovery could have 
been made upon either of the other t\vo conditions, inde-
pendent of the cause \Yithin the exclusion of the policy. 
~Pe also Woodn1an. z;s. Pacific lndenzuily Co., 72 P. 2nd 
~3()~ (Calif. 1937), and the other cases cited in 1:23 A.L.R. 
714. 
Again in a n1ore recent case, J( ershaw vs. Jl!aryland 
Casualty, 342 P. 2nd 72, 77 (Calif. 1959), the insurer 
raised the same defense, claiming that the facts upon 
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which the insured v;as found liable established conclu-
~ively that this liability was within the same exclusionary 
language relating to control of the dan1aged property 
as we have in the instant case. The insured had settled 
the case after the insurer had refused to defend. So1ne 
of the property as a matter of fact, according to the 
co1nplaint "~as not "~ithin the control of the insured. The 
co1nplaint \Yas for some $120,000 and the ~ettleinent \vas 
for $12,000. The Court held that since some of the prop-
erty \Vas not \vithin the control of the insured, a settle-
rnent \vas reasonable and such a ~ettle1nent could not be 
attacked upon the grounds that the suit against the in-
sured \Yas barred conclusively by the allegation of con-
trol of the property. See also Larnzie-Estatet.;.· '0. Onzni-
rhroJne Corp., 275 .K.Y. 42G, 10 N.E. 793. 
In the instant case \Ve have seven clear allegations 
of negligence, none of \Yhich depend upon the general 
statement of control of the property, and each one of 
\Vhich \Vould support an a\\~ard of da1nage~. Therefore \Ye 
have in our ease a 1nuch ~tronger ha~i~ for holding that 
thP judgn1ent is not conclusiYe than existed in any other 
of the above cited cases. 
E. THE JUDGMENT HAS NO REFERENCE TO THE 
DAMAGED PROPERTY. 
As is sho\vn in the K ershrnr ca~e, supra, a general 
a ppliea tion of the exclusionary provision should not be 
1na.de, but rather it n1ust be considered in tern1s of the 
spPeific property da1naged "~hich \vas in the care, custo-
dy or control of the insured. Thus in the instant case, 
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thP phrase Hthe "'"ork on the addition and the pre1nises 
thereabout" clearly does not specif~~ that the property 
dcunaged 'vas 'vithin the insured's control, in fact the 
phrase is so general that it is virtually impossible to de-
terinine the specific property contemplated. Yet under 
the cases rited above, the law is clear that insured is only 
barred in its clai1n if all of the property for 'vhich judg-
Inent or settlement was made clearly falls 'vithin the 
exclusionary language. 
The pleadings in Civil No. 116,222 indicate in part 
sou1e of the problems 'vith 'vhich the parties "~ere faced 
in deter1nining liability for the damage, to-,vit: the re-
lationship of Fibre-Glas as a subcontractor and its part 
in performing the work; the fact that Plewe had finished 
'vith its 'vork in the area of the fire; the payment by 
Fibre Glas of one half of the damages suffered by Cuda-
hay; the possession and ownership by Cudahay of much 
of the equipn1ent "~hich 'vas damaged and its location 
"~ith reference to the fire; the location of other parts of 
the Cudahay plant 'vhere the beef damaged by the fire 
"?as kept; the alleged fact that parts of the plant were in 
possession of Cudahay, and that other contractors to-
gether 'vith n1e1nbers of the public 'vere also on the prop-
erty at the tin1e of the fire. These matters, and probably 
other related matters, all had to be decided in order that 
the· specific application of the exclusionary language 
could be n1ade, and the property actually 'vi thin control 
of the insured could be ascertained. 
Because of the complexity of these factual proble1ns, 
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Appellant argued that the entire file of ·Civil X o. 11G,22:2 
be considered and that Appellants proposed evidence 
be admitted to properly deter1nine these 1natters. Cer-
tainly as the record no'v stand:-; there are no facts, ad-
missions or stipulations establishing that any of the 
svecific items of damage '"'ere "-ithin the control of the 
insured. It seems unlikely that Fibre glas 'vould have 
paid some $59,000 in partial settlement of the clain1, had 
the damaged property been "-ithin the control of the in-
sured. 
In vie\v of all of the above factual issues "-hich are 
still unresolved is it reasonable to hold, as the trial court 
has, that there are no issue of fact, and that Appellant 
is not entitled to put on evidence to settle these questions? 
Is it reasonable to eliminate or fail to consider the evi-
dence \vhich n1ust be considered before the judgment can 
be given any stature, even if it is conclusively binding in 
son1e respects? Certainly not, and .A .. ppellant should be 
g1ven the opportunity to put on this ev-idence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT A 
SUl\IMARY JUDGMENT. 
This Point 11 relating to ~unnnary Judgn1ent is so 
inteJTPlated \vith the problen1~ di~en~sed above on the 
conclusivPness of the prior judgn1ent, that Yery little 
need be said here. Although it is quite fundan1ental that 
j f therp are is~UP~ On lllateria} fact~, ~llll11Uary judg1nents 
\vill not be granted, judg1nent \Vas granted here '"'hen 
ver~" apparently there \Vere n1aterial issues of fact. 
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11his n1atter ea1ne Ul) in a series of pre trial hear-
ings at \rhieh the matter \Yas argued rather piecemeal, 
at \rhieh no record of the proceedings was kept until the 
ver~'" last hearing after the judgn1ent had been entered, 
at ,,·hich Respondent offered parts of the evidenee, and at 
\\·hich _.\ppellant stated its position indicating \\·hat 
the evidence 'vould be, contrary to the statement of the 
Court on page :2 (R. 40) (R. 5:2-G2). c·ertainly SU('h a 
procedure has been prejudicial to the rights of _Appellant 
in atte1npting to obtain a justiciable decision on the 
merits. 
Ad1nittedly, if Paragraph 2 of Count II of the eoln-
plaint conclusively settles all issues of fact and la\\. an<l 
thus bars Appellant in its recovery herein, then this 
n1atter rightfully can be handled in a su1nmary fashion. 
Ho\\·ever, Appellant strongly urges for the many reasons 
set forth above, that evidence must be taken to properly 
determine the factual issues concerning care, custody 
and control of the property. The pleadings and the in-
terrogatories in Civil No. 116,222, together \vith the 
proferred evidence all point up facts 'vhich have not yet 
been resolved. 
SUMMARY 
The confession of judgment based solely and speci-
fically upon negligence can not now be extended to cover 
so1ne indefinite cause based upon a statement "the 'vork 
on said addition and the premises thereabout "'"ere under 
the exclusive control of the defendant.". The statPntent 
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relates to the actual labor involved and has nothing to 
do with the control of any property. Even assuming that 
the statement does concern itself ''Tith control of prop-
erty, it certainly is not the only basis for liability, and 
clearly is not the basis for negligence liability. Yet the 
confession of judgment is based solely upon negligence. 
Therefore unless the only cause of action upon \Yhich 
recovery could be had is one clearly within the exclu-
~ionary language of the policy, the judgn1ent or settle-
ment is not a bar to this suit by the insured against the 
insurer. Appellant submits that such is clearly not the 
case here. Furthermore, even if paragraph 2 of ·Count 
II were the only cause of action upon ,v-hich recovery 
could be predicated and upon wrhich judgment \Vas COn-
fessed, it does not of itself fall \vithin the exclusionary 
language of the policy, and is meaningless \vithout fur-
ther evidence to show its applicability to the actual 
dan1age sought by ·Cudahay. 
\\Therefore Appellant respectfully subn1its this mat-
ter should be ren1anded to the trial court for a trial on 
the fact8. 
Res pectf u ll ~ T s u bn1i tted, 
ED\\'"ARD \\'". CLYDE 
ELLIOTT I~EE PR~\TT 
l'1 L \'"l)E and 1\IECH .. :\:\[ 
Attorneys for .. A.ppellant 
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